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 1 Introduction
Germany1 has the largest number of foreign individuals in Europe, and foreign workers represent
around 10% of the total labor force.2 The socio-economic worries produced by rising immigration
led the German government to introduce a selective immigration system based on quotas, which
was passed by the parliament but declared void by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2002. In
2004 a comprehensive Immigration Act introduced the possibility for migrant workers to change
their temporary residence permit for an unlimited one after having paid at least 60 monthly
contributions to social security, provided that they pass a German language pro¯ciency test.3
German labor market institutions are characterized by rigidity and generous unemployment
bene¯ts, which increases the potential for negative consequences due to immigration: newcomers
are more likely to stay jobless and impose a cost on society. Such institutional features, speci¯c
to Germany, prevent the possibility of a straightforward extension from recent analyses focusing
on the United States (Borjas 2003, Ottaviano and Peri 2006), the United Kingdom (Manacorda,
et al 2006) and Israel (Friedberg, 2001) to the German case. Those countries all have much more
°exible labor markets, lower hiring and ¯ring costs and smaller unemployment insurance vis-a-
vis Germany. Two considerations, however, emerge from those studies that should inform the
analysis of the e®ects of immigration in Germany. First, the e®ects of immigration depend on
the composition of native and immigrant workers, in terms of education and experience, and not
just on the overall in°ow of immigrants. In the case of Germany, this is stressed by De New and
Zimmermann (1994) who analyze the wage e®ects of immigration to Germany for the 1984-1989
period. Segmenting the national labor market across industries, these authors ¯nd that immigrant
workers substitute for unskilled natives and complement skilled natives. Second, and less obvious,
is that even after controlling for education and experience, native and immigrant workers are not
1We thank Mark Bryan, Andreas Damelang, Joan Esteban, Marco Francesconi, Annette Haas, Tim Hatton,
Arianna Miglietta, Cheti Nicoletti, Thomas Siedler, Max Steinhardt, Silvia Stiller and seminar participants at the
Bank of Italy, Fondazione Mattei, the Hamburg Institute for International Economics (HWWI), ISER and IZA for
very helpful comments and suggestions. D'Amuri is grateful for support from the Economic and Social Research
Council. Ottaviano gratefully acknowledges the ¯nancial support from the Volkswagen Foundation as part of the
Study Group on Migration and Integration, \Diversity, Integration and the Economy". Peri gratefully acknowledges
the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for generously funding his migration-related research.
2Authors' calculation using the IAB data introduced in section 4.
3See Zimmermann et al. (2007) for an outline and an economic evaluation of the norms contained in the Immi-
gration Act.
3perfectly substitutable.
Certainly the labor market e®ects of immigration are sensitive to the institutional setup.4
For instance, the importance of labor market institutions in mediating the e®ects of immigration
on wages and employment is stressed by Angrist and Kugler (2003). For a panel of European
Economic Area countries for 1983-1999, those authors show that labor market rigidities cause
adverse employment e®ects. This ¯nding echoes the results of Pischke and Velling (1997) who,
using data on 167 German regions for the 1985-1989 period, show some evidence of the displacement
of the native workforce by immigration. More recently, Glitz (2006) analyzes the speci¯c issue of
the impact of ethnic German immigration on relative skill-speci¯c employment and wage rates of
the resident population in di®erent geographical areas between 1996 and 2001. He ¯nds evidence
of adverse employment e®ects but no detrimental e®ects on average wages.
The present paper investigates the interactions between immigration, employment and wages
in Western Germany using a more structural general equilibrium approach recently employed in
several national studies (Aydemir and Borjas, 2006; Borjas, 2003; Manacorda et al., 2006; Ot-
taviano and Peri, 2006). This approach is based on the aforementioned idea that the average
and distributive e®ects of immigration depend on the exact composition of native and immigrant
workers in terms of education and experience. This requires a careful estimation of the comple-
mentarities between di®erent groups of workers because the marginal productivity (wages) of each
group depends on the supply of workers in each other group. In particular, we allow native and
migrant workers to be imperfect substitutes in production, even if sharing the same education and
experience levels as in Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Manacorda et al. (2006). In addition, in
contrast to these works, we also allow for a further degree of imperfect substitutability between
old and recent immigrant workers. Moreover, to account for the institutional frictions existing in
the German labor market, we investigate not only the wage e®ects of immigration but also its
employment e®ects.
Our results provide a full picture of the adjustment of the Western German labour market to
migration in the period from 1987 to 2001. In terms of employment, we ¯nd negative but moderate
e®ects of new immigrants on previous immigrants, while we do not ¯nd evidence of such e®ects on
native workers. Reinforcing the evidence of stronger competition between new and old immigrants
than between immigrants and native workers, we also ¯nd that natives and new immigrants are
imperfect substitutes in production while new and old immigrants seem to be perfect substitutes.
4For a theoretical model in which labor market institutions prevent wages from falling to their market clearing
level when immigration occurs, see Schmidt et al. (1994).
4Di®erent estimates for the elasticity of substitution imply di®erent impacts of new immigrants on
wages: very small for native workers, and somewhat negative for old immigrant workers. However,
while employment e®ects are absent for all natives regardless of their educational attainment, wage
e®ects show some variation as native workers with medium-low education face rising wages (by
0.36/1.04% from 1987 to 2001) and workers with high education see their wages fall (by -1.49%
from 1987 to 2001). This is due to the fact that in the period of observation immigrants are more
concentrated in the group with medium-high education than in the group with low education. As
for the e®ects of new immigration on migrant workers already settled in West Germany, focusing
on the e®ects of post-1992 immigration on pre-1992 immigrants (we call this last group long-term
immigrants), we ¯nd that on average new immigrants depress long-term immigrants' wages by
-1.64% and two long-term immigrants lose their jobs for every ten new immigrants employed.
Again, given the educational distribution of new immigrants, wage and job losses are concentrated
in the group of long-term immigrants with relatively high educational attainment.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 brie°y outlines the relevant features of the history
of immigration in Germany. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework behind our evaluation of
the wage and employment e®ects of immigration. Section 4 presents the data used for our econo-
metric analysis together with some descriptive evidence on the evolution of wage and employment
levels in the German workforce. Results from the econometric analysis of the employment e®ects
of immigration are discussed in Section 5 which also estimates the substitutability between natives
and migrant workers. Section 6 uses the results of the previous section to calculate the general
equilibrium e®ects of immigration on wages. Section 7 concludes.
2 Immigration to West Germany
After World War II West Germany experienced two large °ows of immigrants. First, during the
1950's and 1960's, the country experienced a large in°ow of Turks and Southern European (mostly
unskilled) workers with no German background. Then, during the early 1990's, so-called ethnic
Germans (individuals with German ancestry returning from abroad), and East Germans moved
en masse to West Germany.5
The ¯rst in°ow of foreign workers began in the mid-1950s. In that period the recruitment
of guest workers coming mainly from South and South-East European countries started. Guest
workers were poorly quali¯ed workers recruited for a limited period of one to two years and then
5For a detailed description of immigration °ows in Germany and for a survey of empirical results of its labor
market impact see Zimmermann et al. (2007).
5required to return to their countries of origin. The in°ow of foreigners steadily increased during the
cold war period until the 1973 oil crisis, when the economic downturn induced the government to
ban the recruitment of workers from abroad. According to the German Federal Statistical O±ce,
in that year foreign population accounted for around 6.4% of West Germany's total population.
Notwithstanding the ban on the recruitment of guest workers, the foreign population remained
constant, thanks to family reuni¯cations for those workers who managed to settle permanently in
Germany.6
After the end of the Cold War, Germany resumed the temporary migration policy, mainly at-
tracting workers from Central and Eastern Europe. Over the eleven years following the reuni¯cation
in 1990, more than 2 millions Germans moved from the East to the West.(Statistisches-Bundesamt-
Deutschland (2006a)) Another parallel immigration °ow of ethnic Germans involved 2.8 million
people between 1988 and 2001 (Statistisches-Bundesamt-Deutschland (2006b)). Ethnic Germans
are a peculiar group of immigrants because they have German nationality but, since they lived
abroad for a long period (often more than one generation), their knowledge of the German language
and of German habits is not comparable to that of natives. For example, according to Federal Ad-
ministration O±ce data reported in Bauer et al. (2005), 62.6% of 133817 ethnic Germans applying
for admission to Germany between July 1996 and April 1999 failed the German language test. In
the words of Zimmermann (1999), \ethnic Germans are basically facing the same di±culties with
social and economic integration as foreigners". Overall, in 2001 7.3 million foreigners accounted
for 8.8% of the total German population.
3 Theoretical framework
To analyze the wage and employment e®ects of immigration in West Germany we use a framework
similar to the one Ottaviano and Peri (2006); Borjas (2003) adopted to analyze immigration to the
US. Output is produced using a combination of physical capital and a labor composite of groups
of workers di®ering in their education, age and national origins. The wage paid to each group is
equal to its skill-speci¯c marginal productivity jointly determined by the supplies of the various
types of labor and their productivity. However, in the context of the German labor market, we
augment the original setup of Ottaviano and Peri (2006); Borjas (2003) with elements used by
Saint-Paul (1996), Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) as well as Angrist and Kugler (2003) to study
6Even if guest workers were formally allowed to spend only a limited time period in Germany, this provision
was not e®ectively enforced. Moreover, no recruitment halt was possible for foreign workers coming from European
Community countries.
6the e®ects of labor market regulation. In particular, to ¯t the high °exibility of the US labor
market, Ottaviano and Peri (2006); Borjas (2003) assume that the labor supplies of native and
previously settled migrant workers (`old immigrants', for brevity) are perfectly inelastic. Hence,
in their setup the in°ow of new immigrants is entirely absorbed by changing wages. However, in
the case of Germany, an additional and potentially relevant adjustment channel is constituted by
changes in employment. Thus, following Angrist and Kugler (2003), we allow for some degree of
°exibility in the labor supplies of both natives and old immigrants.
Using this framework wage elasticities and employment responses are estimated, focusing on
the e®ect of new immigration on old immigrants and natives. The estimated wage elasticities and
labor supply responses are then combined in order to reconstruct the overall e®ect of immigration
on the Western German labor market.
3.1 Labor Demand
Labor demand is determined by the pro¯t maximizing choices of ¯rms that employ labor and
physical capital (K) to produce a homogeneous ¯nal output under constant returns to scale and
perfect competition. Technology is such that physical capital and the labor composite are combined
in a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce output. The labor composite is itself a CES
aggregator of employees with di®erent work experience nested within educational groups. We allow
for further degrees of possible imperfect substitutability between natives and immigrants and also




where the subscript t indicates the time period, Yt is output, At is total factor productivity (TFP),
Kt is physical capital, Lt is the CES aggregator of di®erent types of employees and ® 2 (0;1) is












where Lkt is itself a CES aggregator of employees with educational level k and µkt are education
speci¯c productivity levels standardized such that
P
k µkt = 1. Workers are grouped in three
educational levels, k = 1;2;3, that, as will be detailed in Section 4.1, correspond to workers with
no vocational degree, workers with a vocational degree and workers with tertiary education. The
parameter ± > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between workers with di®erent education.
As in (Card and Lemieux, 2001), workers with the same education but di®erent work experience















where j = 1;2;:::;8 is an index capturing ¯ve-year intervals of potential experience, spanning from
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 40 years. The term ´ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution
between workers with the same education but di®erent potential experience and µkj are their
education-experience speci¯c productivity levels, standardized such that
P
j µkjt = 1. Following
Ottaviano and Peri (2006), native and immigrant workers are allowed to be imperfect substitutes
in production since, at least for the US and the UK, there is evidence that the two groups have
di®erent abilities and skills which are likely to a®ect their comparative advantage and hence their













where Hkjt and Mkjt denote, respectively, native (`Home') and immigrant (`Migrant') workers;
¾ > 1 is their elasticity of substitution; µHkjt and µMkjt are their speci¯c productivities with





















kjt respectively denote migrants with education k and experience j who
migrated to Germany before and after 1992. In Section 4.1 we will argue that 1992 is an interesting
watershed to identify `old' (sometimes also called `long-term' immigrants) and `new' immigrants,
particularly because German migrants from East to West are reported in the dataset starting with
that year. In (5) the parameter ¸ > 1 denotes their elasticity of substitution while µOLD
kjt and
µNEW
kjt represent their speci¯c productivity levels standardized so that µOLD
kjt + µNEW
kjt = 1.
The production function (1) can be used to calculate the demand for each type of labor at
a given period t. The relative e±ciency parameters (µ) and the total factor productivity At
depend on technological factors and are independent from the supply of migrant workers. In a
competitive equilibrium and taking output as the numeraire good, the natural logarithm of the
wage of native workers with education k and experience j equals the natural logarithm of their


























8where ·t = Kt=Lt is the capital-labor ratio. Similarly, the natural logarithm of the wage of old






































Turning to the supply side of the labor market, we allow for the potential role of labor market reg-
ulation by assuming that the labor supply of natives and old immigrants is elastic and determined
by unemployment insurance, since this is indeed a key characteristic of our dataset (see Section
4.1 for details). In particular, we assume that the labor supply function of natives with education
k and experience j is:
Hkjt = [wHkjt (1 ¡ r)]
» Hkjt (8)
where Hkjt is the corresponding population, wHkjt is the wage rate as de¯ned in the above section,
r ¸ 0 is the unemployment insurance replacement rate and » > 0 is the labor supply elasticity.
Expression (8) captures the fact that employment supply by native workers responds to the unin-
sured portion of the wage they receive. Hence a change in wages (produced by a change in supply
of some type of labor) may induce an employment response from natives. An analogous expression










While the populations of native and old immigrant workers, Hkjt and M
OLD
kjt , are given, the
population of new immigrants is subject to exogenous shocks that map one-to-one into shifts in
their labor supply. In particular, since new immigrants appear in our dataset only upon ¯nding
their ¯rst job in Germany, we assume that the labor supply of new immigrants MNEW
kjt coincides
with their population. Accordingly, MNEW
kjt is exogenous whereas Hkjt and MOLD
kjt are endogeneusly
determined as wages adjust to the in°ow of MNEW
kjt .
3.3 E®ects of Immigration on Wages
While in the short-run physical capital may be sluggish, on average it adjusts to changes in labor
supply so as to keep its real rate of return constant. This implies that, in expressions (6) and (7),
the capital-labor ratio ·t follows a trend determined only by the growth of total factor productivity
At. Hence, the overall impact of new immigration on wages paid to native workers is obtained
9by taking the total derivative of equation (6) with respect to the changes in all the labor aggre-
gates (Lt;Lkt;Lkjt) induced by new immigrants in the various education and experience groups.
















































































i(wMmitMmit + wHmitHmit) is the share of total
wage income paid to migrant workers of education k and experience j in year t and sHkjt is the
share of wage income paid to native workers in the same education-experience group. Similarly,




i(wMmitMmit + wHmitHmit) is the share in wage income
paid to all workers of education k and experience j in year t; skt is the wage share paid to all
workers with education k in year t, and so on. The ¯rst double summation captures the cross-
e®ects of immigration in groups of any education-experience level, the second summation captures
the e®ects of immigration in groups with the same education at all experience levels, and the third
and fourth e®ects capture the e®ects of immigrants within the same education-experience group.
The term ¢Mkjt=Mkjt = (Mkjt+1 ¡ Mkjt)=Mkjt represents the change in the supply of immi-
grant workers with education k and experience j over the period between t and t+1. Analogously,
the term (¢Hkjt=Hkjt)response represents the change in labor supply of native workers in the same
group caused by immigration. These terms account for the employment e®ects of immigration that

































Taken together with (10), expressions (11) imply that employment e®ects will have conse-
quences for the impact of immigration on wages. A complete analytical solution of the e®ects of
immigration on wages would require substituting expressions (11) into (10) and then solving for
¢wHkjt=wHkjt as a function of the change in new immigrants only, ¢MNEW
kjt =MNEW
kjt . That would
10give a reduced form dependence of wages in each group on immigration, incorporating demand and
supply parameters. In our empirical implementation, however, since we can observe ¢Hkjt=Hkjt
and ¢MOLD
kjt =MOLD
kjt , we will estimate empirically their supply response to ¢MNEW
kjt =MNEW
kjt (see
equation (14)) and then include such estimation into (10).

















































































































































To sum up, once the parameters ±;´;¾ and ¸ are estimated and once we know the employment
responses of old immigrants and native workers to new immigrants, we will be able to calculate
the wage e®ects of immigration for each group.
4 Data and Preliminary Evidence
In this section we present our dataset and discuss some preliminary evidence on the e®ects of
immigration on German employment and wages.
4.1 The IAB Employment Subsample
The data we employ are from the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB).7 The ad-
ministrative dataset spans the period 1975-2001 and covers all employment spells subject to social
security taxation and the unemployment spells during which the individual receives unemployment
bene¯ts. The population includes workers and trainees liable to make social security contributions.
Self-employed, civil servants and students enrolled in higher education are not included in the
dataset. According to Bender et al. (2000), in 1995 the population covers nearly 79.4% of all em-
ployed individuals in Western Germany, but the coverage varies across occupations and industries
7See Bender et al. (2000) for a detailed description .
11(coverage levels are not declared). The data we use are an annual random sample of 2% of the
overall relevant population for a total of around 500,000 employment spells per year.
The IAB dataset is well suited for the analysis of labor market outcomes in the German labor
market thanks to its large size (for the period 1975-2001 it records more than 20 million employment
spells) and to its reliability. For each employment spell, all the relevant information regarding
employees liable to pay into social security is collected by the employer and reported directly
to the social security agencies. Measurement error is therefore kept to a minimum. Since the
transmission of all the relevant information to the employment agency is mandatory, there are no
issues arising from unit non-response.
At the same time, the data have some minor limitations. All the available information covers
only the period starting in 1975 and, given the administrative nature of the dataset, no recall
questions can give information on the working history of each worker prior to that date. As a
consequence, for instance, it is not possible to reconstruct the exact working experience of an
individual but it will be necessary to impute it. In so doing, we follow the standard assumption
that the potential experience is equal to the worker's age minus the typical age at which she is
expected to have completed her education (Borjas (2003)).
A second and, for our purposes, more severe limitation of the data is that for immigrants neither
the place of birth, nor the year of arrival in West Germany are recorded. What is available for
each individual is the exact nationality at the country level. This is consistent with the fact that
in Germany, until 2000, citizenship was de¯ned according to the jus sanguinis principle.8 Since
the focus of this paper is on immigration rather than nationality, this requires further assumptions
about the link between the former and the latter. In particular, we assume that workers with
foreign nationality can be considered as immigrants. This approximation is subject to two types of
errors. On the one hand, by using foreign nationality to identify immigrants, we may undercount
them in the presence of high naturalization rates. This does not seem to be the case for Germany
over the considered period. Table 1 reports our calculations based on the Federal Statistical O±ce
data. The annual naturalization rate, de¯ned as the average of the annual ratio of naturalizations
to foreign population, was never higher than 2% during the 1987-2001 period. On the other
hand, in the presence of a large second generation of immigrants with foreign nationality, we
may overcount the number of immigrants. However, since we identify most of our e®ects from
8In year 2000 the principle of birthplace (jus soli) was added to the jus sanguinis one, allowing individuals born
in Germany to naturalize provided that at least one of their parents is German born or has been living legally in
the country for 8 years. Dual citizenship may be retained until the 23rd birthday, when the individual has to choose
between the German nationality and her parents' one (for details see Zimmermann et al. (2007)).
12the changes in a cohort of immigrants, the presence of a constant group of second generation
immigrants will not a®ect the estimates much. Moreover, besides workers with foreign nationality
we also identify two other groups as immigrants: German workers who migrated from the East
to the West after reuni¯cation (and recorded as East German by the IAB); and ethnic German
workers, who primarily immigrated from Eastern Europe and who constitute the largest share of
recent immigrant in°ows and will be identi¯ed as explained in Section 4.2.
Our analysis focuses on the period 1987-2001. During this period an extremely large in°ux
of immigrants substantially increased the share of non-Western German workers in the Western
German labor force. Table 2 reports the share of immigrants in the labor force as reported in the
IAB dataset, showing that it climbed from 9.3% in 1987 to 13% in 2001. The time period analyzed
is particularly convenient for the analysis of the labor market impact of immigration: the arrival
of migrant workers was mostly driven by push factors (namely the fall of the Iron Curtain and the
uncertainty following the aftermath of socialism in the countries of origin) rather than pull ones.
Indeed, the large and sudden rise in the share of immigrant workers, mostly due to push factors,
makes the behavior of the German labor market during our period of observation somewhat of a
`natural experiment'{ one which is well suited to assessing the impact of immigration on incumbent
workers.9
For each relevant year we include in our analysis men aged 17 to 64 who were working and
receiving salary income on the 1st of July.10 Nominal gross wages are all converted to 2000 Euros
using the CPI-based de°ator across years. As already anticipated, years of potential experience
are calculated as current age minus the age at which the worker entered the labor force. This age
of entry is assumed to be 16 for high school dropouts with no vocational education, 19 for high
school dropouts with vocational education or high school graduates without vocational education,
21 for high school graduates with vocational education, 24 for those who completed non-university
higher education and 25 for workers who hold a university degree.
The dataset reports gross daily wages, which are right censored by the upper limit of the social
insurance contribution. Right censoring occurs in around 2% of the spells. Censored wages are
then imputed using the estimated wage values obtained from the estimation of a Tobit regression
model. This is run separately for each year and includes the following independent variables:
experience, experience squared, educational attainment, nationality, 17 sectoral dummies and 131
occupational dummies.
9Bauer et al. (2005), p. 217, provide descriptive evidence on the independence between the growth of foreign
employment and the business cycle after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
10As a robustness check, we also run all the regressions on the sample including both men and women.
13The theoretical framework outlined in Section 3 strati¯es native and non-native workers in
cells de¯ned by di®erent education and experience levels, assuming perfect substitutability among
workers within the same cell and imperfect substitution across cells. An important question is
whether, in grouping natives and immigrants, one should take education and potential experience
data at face value. For instance, recent work on the UK reveals a substantial educational down-
grading among immigrants, who tend to accept jobs requiring a lower level of quali¯cations than
the ones actually achieved (Dustmann et al., 2007). In this case the reported level of education
can be a poor indicator of the labor market position of immigrants, decreasing the preciseness
of our strati¯cation of workers across education-experience cells. In order to address this prob-
lem, we group native and immigrant workers according to reported education as well as according
to `adjusted' educational levels. In particular, similar to Card (2001) and Card (2007), for each
available year we run an ordered probit regression for the native population with the reported
level of education as the dependent variable and 17 sectoral plus 131 occupational dummies as
independent variables. This regression estimates for each worker the probability of having each
of the six possible educational levels, given his position in the labor market. Table 3 shows a
comparison between the densities of the reported and estimated educational levels of the native
population in year 2001. Out of sample predictions are obtained for all immigrant workers and for
those natives who failed to report their educational level and should otherwise have been dropped
from the sample.11 The corresponding densities, averaged across individuals in each year, are then
used to calculate weighted employment and wage levels for our education-experience cells. In this
way migrant workers are assigned a probability distribution for their educational level which is
consistent with that of the natives for a given job. Workers in the same `equivalent education'
cell are employed in sectors that require a homogeneous skill level. While this correction should
improve the homogeneity of workers' skills within the group, it is more subject to endogeneity bias
as immigrants may adjust their occupation in Germany according to sectoral demand. For this
reason, we also show the estimates when groupings are de¯ned according to reported education.
The six educational levels distinguishable in the dataset are further aggregated in three levels: `Low
Education' includes individuals without vocational education; `Intermediate Education' includes
individuals with vocational education; and `High Education' includes individuals who completed a
university degree or with non-university higher education.
Finally, a worker is considered as Western German if her nationality is German and if she
11The percentage of workers not reporting their educational level is signi¯cant (11.3% in 2001) and could bias our
sample if the non-response behaviour is not homogeneous across individuals with di®erent education-experience or
migration background.
14has always been working in West Germany. Migrants moving from East Germany are identi¯ed
as individuals with German nationality who started working in the East and then moved to the
West. Even if German reuni¯cation took place in 1990, East Germany is recorded in our data
only starting with 1992. Foreign migrants are individuals who have a non-German nationality
or ethnic Germans coming from abroad. Particular attention is devoted to identifying the ethnic
German group of immigrants. These are immigrants mostly from Eastern European countries and,
as discussed in Section 2, tend to behave just like other immigrants from those countries. However,
they are barely distinguishable from Western German nationals in the data set. We describe in
the next section how we deal with their presence in our empirical strategy.
4.2 Imputing Ethnic German immigrants
With the end of the cold war a large number of ethnic Germans (slightly less than 3 million over the
period 1989-2001 according to Bundesverwaltungsamt (2003)) previously living in Eastern Europe
moved to West Germany, settling there permanently.12 These immigrants, after having successfully
applied for a visa in the German embassy of their country of origin, were allowed to enter Germany
enjoying unrestricted rights of German citizenship upon arrival.
Since in the dataset only nationality identi¯ers are reported, we are not able to distinguish
ethnic German workers from Western German workers in the individual records. However, omitting
their in°ow would distort our analysis especially as they were correlated over time with that of
immigrants from East Germany and from other foreign countries. Indeed, ethnic Germans were
mostly born abroad and were not able to speak German °uently at their arrival, hence they were
in all respects more comparable to immigrants than to Western German nationals. Due to the lack
of individual data, empirical studies trying to assess the labor market impact and the integration
of the ethnic Germans have found a mixed set of results (see Bauer et al. (2005) for a survey).
As reported in Section 2, the perception is that \Ethnic Germans are basically facing the same
di±culties with social and economic integration as foreigners" (Zimmermann, 1999) and, therefore,
they should be considered as foreign immigrants in our context.
As we are unable to recognize their individual identity from our dataset, we estimate their total
in°ow in each education-experience-year and then identify the impact of such in°ow (together with
those of East Germans and foreigners) on the employment levels and wages of old immigrants and
native Germans. To construct such estimates, we merge di®erent sources of information. First, we
obtain the in°ow of ethnic Germans by year of arrival and country of origin from Bundesverwal-
12See Bauer and Zimmermann (1997) for an analysis of labor market integration of ethnic German workers.
15tungsamt (2003) and Statistisches-Bundesamt-Deutschland (2006b), respectively. Then, from the
IAB data we retrieve the exact information on the characteristics and labor market performance
of foreign immigrants coming from the same set of countries in the same year of arrival as ethnic
Germans.13 Finally, we assume that, for country of origin x and year of arrival t, the educational
and age composition of ethnic Germans is identical to that of foreign immigrants and that, within
education-experience cells, ethnic Germans and foreign immigrants from the same country of ori-
gin have exactly the same labor market performance in terms of employment levels and wages. For
example, we consider ethnic Germans who migrated to West Germany from the Czech Republic
in 1994 as exactly mirroring in their observed and unobserved characteristics the group of Czech
citizens migrating to West Germany in the same year.
Speci¯cally, as a ¯rst step, for each of the major ethnic Germans' countries x and each year t,
we construct fxkjt = Mxkjt=Mxt as the share of immigrant workers with education k and experience
j in the total immigrant °ow. We then calculate the imputed number of immigrant ethnic German
workers from country x with education k and experience j in year t as:
Extkj = Extfxtkj
where Ext is the total yearly in°ow of ethnic Germans from country x in year t. Since the
in°ows of ethnic German and foreign immigrants from a speci¯c country x can be highly volatile,
our second step is to smooth the imputed values by taking averages over two consecutive years.
We then attribute to each group Extkj the average wage of foreign immigrants coming from the
same country x in the same year t and with the same education and age. After those two steps,
we obtain a complete education-experience distribution of employment and wages for the ethnic
German immigrants by country of origin x and year of arrival t. Summing across di®erent years of
arrival (starting with 1987) and countries of origin, we ¯nally obtain the employment levels within
education-experience cells for each year. Similarly the cell-speci¯c wages are reconstructed using
a weighted average of average wages by country of origin and year of arrival. As a ¯nal step, we
subtract the imputed employment levels by cell from the analogous cells of the native Western
German population and we add them to the immigrant population.
To summarize, this procedure allows us to account for the large variations in in°ows of ethnic
Germans across years and country of origin assuming that within year-of-arrival and country-of-
origin they are essentially identical to those of the other immigrants.
13The countries are: Czech Republic, Slovakia, former Soviet Union, former Yugoslavia, Hungaria, Poland, Roma-
nia.
164.3 Stylized Facts and Descriptive Statistics
Let us ¯rst describe simple aggregate evidence that points to the existence of signi¯cant di®erences
in labor market performances between immigrants and natives. Figure 1 shows the evolution of
the share of individuals receiving unemployment bene¯ts relative to the total workforce (`unem-
ployment rates'), calculated separately for native Germans and immigrant workers for the period
1987-2001 from the IAB dataset. Two tendencies emerge. First, the rates for native German
and foreign workers are quite stable and fairly similar in the period 1987-1991, a period of rela-
tively small in°ow of immigrants. Second, beginning in 1991 the unemployment rate of foreigners
increases signi¯cantly. For native Germans it increases much less, opening a gap that is quite
persistent, though reduced towards the end of the 1990's. At the same time, Figure 2 shows that,
while wages for natives increased in real terms in the period 1987-2001, wages for immigrants de-
creased. Both facts suggest that the large in°ow of immigrants in the early 1990's crowded out and
a®ected more negatively the labor market opportunities of other immigrants rather than oppor-
tunities for natives. This could be explained by the existence of skill and occupational di®erences
between natives and immigrants in the spirit of the model proposed in Section 3.
Table 4 reports the shares of immigrants in the total workforce with di®erent educational
attainments and potential experience levels for selected years. We always reclassify the ethnic
Germans as immigrants following the procedure described in the previous section. The share of
the non-native workforce in total employment increases by more than 50% from 1987 to 2001.
This is the consequence of rising shares of immigrant workers across all educational levels. The
largest in°ow in relative terms occured among workers with high educational levels, while the
least educated immigrants increased as a share of that group from 1987 to 1992 and remained
constant thereafter. Migrants' shares in the other two educational groups steadily increased over
time. However, the overall di®erences in the in°ows of immigrants across education groups are
much smaller than those experienced in the USA during recent decades, where immigration has
been remarkably concentrated among very low levels (`high school dropouts') or very high levels
(`college graduates') of education with much smaller in°ows for intermediate levels (`high school
graduates').14
Regarding the place of origin of immigrants, a clear pattern emerges. From 1987 to 1992 the
increase in migrant workers was caused by a massive in°ow of individuals with foreign nationality
and ethnic Germans from outside Germany. Subsequently, the share of immigrants in the total
workforce remained stable as the rise in the number of immigrants from East Germany was almost
14See, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri (2006).
17o®set by a fall in the number of workers with foreign nationality. Hence, the most recent wave of
immigrants, mostly from East Germany, replaced earlier waves from foreign countries.
To summarize, a preliminary look at the data suggest that there has been a substantial increase
in the number of immigrant workers over the period of observation. While this increase has been
quite evenly distributed across educational levels, the labor market performance of migrants has
been worse compared to natives both in terms of wage growth and in terms of unemployment rates.
This suggests that in the German labor market new immigrants tend to displace old immigrants
more than natives. The following econometric analysis will investigate this hypothesis.
5 Employment E®ects and Workers' Substitutability
The aim of the present section is to estimate the employment and wage responses of old immigrants
and natives to the arrival of new immigrants building on the theoretical framework detailed in
Section 3. We proceed in three steps. First, we use empirical speci¯cations of (8) and (9) to estimate
the e®ects of new immigration on the employment levels of native and old immigrant workers in
the same skill group. Second, from the production function (1) we derive empirical speci¯cations
that allow us to estimate the various elasticities of substitution. In particular, we estimate on our
data the elasticities of substitution between native and immigrant statuses for given education and
experience (¾) as well as between new and old immigrant statuses for given education, experience
and native-vs-immigrant status (¸). We also take from the existing literature consensus estimates
of the elasticities of substitution between educational levels (±) as well as between experience levels
for a given educational level (´). Third and last, once we have the estimated employment e®ects
and elasticities of substitution, we use expressions (10) and (12) to compute the impacts of the
in°ow of new immigrants on the wages of natives and old immigrants.
5.1 Employment E®ects
We start by estimating the response of old immigrants' and natives' employment levels to the
in°ow of new immigrants in the same education-experience cells.
5.1.1 E®ects of New Immigrants on Employment of Old Immigrants
Following a standard speci¯cation (see, e.g., Card 2007), we assess the possible employment e®ects
of new immigrants on old immigrants by regressing the increase in the total employment of immi-
grants on the increase in employment due to new immigrants. In so doing we identify 1992 as a
18watershed between previous immigration waves and more recent ones driven mostly by the in°ows
of ethnic Germans and immigrants from East Germany. Accordingly, we call `new immigrants'
those entering West Germany after 1992 and `old immigrants' those entering West Germany before
1992. The reason is that immigrants from East Germany are present in our dataset starting with
1992. Moreover, in contrast to previous immigration waves, their massive in°ow is primarily dri-
ven by push factors and thus provides an interesting natural experiment with which to study the
e®ects of a positive, exogenous migration-driven supply shock on the labor market performance of
incumbent workers.
To estimate the impact of new immigrants on the employment of old immigrants, we estimate
the following speci¯cation derived from (9):
¢Mkjt¡1
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. In (13) Dkj, and Dkt are,
respectively, education-experience and education-year interactions included in order to control for
systematic di®erences in employment growth across the two dimensions and ukjt is a zero mean
cell-speci¯c random shock. Since the data used are yearly data, the coe±cient ° captures the
short-run employment e®ect of recent immigration on the employment of previous immigrants. A
value of ° = 1 implies that an in°ow of post-1992 immigrants with education k and experience j
equal to 1% of the initial employment in that group is associated with an increase in total migrant
employment within the same education-experience cell of 1%. In this case, new immigrants add to
previous employment without crowding out any old immigrants. In contrast, an estimated value of
° > 1 (° < 1) implies that new immigrants increase (crowd out) the employment of old immigrants.
Note that the group of pre-1992 immigrants with less than 10 years of experience steadily
declines from 1992 to 2001 leaving us with few or no observations in the corresponding cells for the
last years of the sample. This happens by de¯nition since we classify workers according to their
potential experience, which increases by one unit every year. For example, in 1997 there are no
pre-1992 workers with less than 5 years of experience, and so on. To take this into account, we
estimate (13) excluding the 0-5 year experience cell for the whole 1992-2001 period and the 5-10
year cell for the 1997-2001 sub-period.
Table 5 reports the results obtained in estimating equation (13). The ¯rst row reports the
estimates of ° obtained by a Least Squares regression in which cells have been weighted by total
employment. In column I we report the results based on the sample of male workers strati¯ed across
cells of experience and `equivalent education'. The estimated ° equals 0.804 and is statistically
19di®erent from 1 at the 1% level. As a robustness check, we run the same regression also on the full
sample including male and female workers, obtaining an estimated ° equal to 0:847, as reported in
column II. Columns III and IV show the estimation results when workers are classi¯ed according to
their reported education. In this case, the estimated °'s are very close to 1, both when the sample
is restricted to men only (° = 0:980) and when it is unrestricted (° = 1:001). Hence, while no
employment e®ects can be found when workers are classi¯ed according their reported education,
evidence of crowding out emerges when they are classi¯ed in terms of `equivalent education'. This
can be explained as long as our reclassi¯cation allows for better identi¯cation of workers competing
for jobs having a similar skill content. To summarize, when equivalent education is used to stratify
workers, our estimates for ° imply that on average when 10 new immigrants join the German labor
force, 2 old immigrants lose their jobs.
5.1.2 E®ects of New Immigrants on Employment of Natives
To estimate the impact of recent immigrants on the employment of native workers, we use an
empirical speci¯cation based on (8):
¢EMPLkjt¡1
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where EMPLkjt¡1 = Mkjt¡1 + Hkjt¡1 is total employment (immigrants plus natives) with edu-
cation k and experience j at time t ¡ 1 and ¢EMPLkjt = [(Mkjt + Hkjt) ¡ (Mkjt¡1 + Hkjt¡1)] is
its variation from t ¡ 1 to t. The variables Dkj, Dkt are the usual interactions and ukjt is a zero
mean cell-speci¯c random shock. The parameter ½ captures the impact of immigration on total
employment. If it is smaller (larger) than 1, it implies that new immigrants crowd natives out of
(attract natives into) the labor market. If it equals 1, new immigrants have no impact on native
employment.
Table 6 reports the regression results based on (14). As before, column I shows the results
coming from a Least Squares regression on male workers classi¯ed according their `equivalent
education' and experience. Robustness checks are carried out including adding female workers
(column II) and using reported education to stratify workers (columns III and IV). The estimates
for ½ are quite di®erent from the estimates of ° in the previous section. In particular, the parameter
estimates are now always strictly larger than 1 in absolute value, and never signi¯cantly di®erent
from 1 at any standard con¯dence level, implying essentially no crowding out of native employment.
These results seem to preclude the presence of adverse employment e®ects of new immigrants
on natives even in the short run (recall that we use yearly observations). To further check this
result, we run another regression in which we stratify native and migrant workers according to
20their education only, instead of using the ¯ner strati¯cation in education-experience cells. If West-
ern German employers valued di®erently the work experience acquired inside and outside West
Germany, our labor market segmentation along education and experience levels could fail to ap-
propriately identify groups of workers competing for the same jobs. To see whether this is the case,
we group workers only according to their education level and we run the following regression:
¢EMPLkt¡1
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j EMPLkjt¡1, Mkt =
P
j Mkjt¡1 and ukt is a zero mean education-speci¯c
shock. This regression controls for education ¯xed e®ects (Dk) as well as education-speci¯c trends
(Trendk) and is estimated on the usual samples. The corresponding results are reported in Table
7. Even using this speci¯cation, no adverse employment e®ect is identi¯ed. Estimates for ½EDU
lie between 1.078 and 1.515, and are never signi¯cantly di®erent from one.
All in all, the results from employment regressions imply that we can safely rule out the presence
of any adverse e®ect of new immigration on the employment levels of native workers. These results
are consistent with those obtained using a similar framework by Peri (2007). His analysis of
the impact of migration on the California labor market stressed the absence of any signi¯cant
employment e®ects of migrants on natives. In the German case, however, the time horizon is much
shorter (one year) and labor markets are more rigid than in the California analysis, hence the lack
of an e®ect on natives seems to imply a strong segmentation of the labor market, possibly due to
di®erences between immigrants and natives.
5.2 Elasticities of Substitution
We turn now to the estimation of the elasticities of substitution. The empirical evidence discussed
so far highlights the presence of di®erent employment e®ects of recent immigration on the German
labor market: signi¯cant negative e®ects on old immigrants and positive e®ects on natives. These
di®erences seem to con¯rm that immigrant workers compete more between themselves than with
natives, even within groups of similar observable skills. Indeed, if the only relevant variables
for identifying similar workers were their education and experience, we would not observe such
di®erent employment e®ects due to workers' origins. In line with this consideration, the theoretical
framework outlined in Section 3 allows for imperfect substitutability in production between natives
and immigrants as well as between old and recent immigrants. It also suggests how to estimate
the elasticities of substitution between these groups of workers.
215.2.1 Elasticity of Substitution between New and Old Immigrants
In order to estimate the elasticity of substitution between immigrants, we use the logarithmic
wages given by expression (7) for old immigrants and its analogue for new ones. Taking the ratio

























Following Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and Manacorda et al. (2006), we estimate the parameter ¸, im-

























where the set of education (Dk), experience (Dj) and year (Dt) dummies controls for any systematic






.15 The corresponding results are
reported in Table 8. Column I shows an estimate of 1=¸ equal to 0:021 with a standard error
of 0.018, implying that the value of 1=¸ is not statistically di®erent from zero at any con¯dence
level. Accordingly, new and old immigrants appear to be perfect substitutes. This result holds when
the regression is estimated on the sample including both male and female workers as well as when
workers are strati¯ed according to their reported education (columns II, III and IV). Thus, new
and old immigrants are perfectly substitutable and all immigrants belonging to each education-
experience group (Mkjt = MOLD
kjt + MNEW
kjt ) can be considered as forming a homogeneous group
of workers.
5.2.2 Elasticity of Substitution between Natives and Immigrants
Following the same strategy outlined in the previous section, we now estimate the degree of sub-
stitutability between native and immigrant workers in the same education-experience cell. Specif-
ically, we regress the logarithm of the relative wages of natives and immigrants on their relative
employment levels with ¯xed e®ects, using education-experience cells as observations. Regressions
are run on the whole sample from 1987 to 2001 and the corresponding results are reported in Table
9. All columns show that the estimated values for 1=¾ are both positive and signi¯cant, ranging
between 0.045 (column IV: males and females, reported education) to 0.061 (column I: males only,
equivalent education), which implies an estimated elasticity of substitution ranging between 16
and 21. In other words, natives and immigrants are not perfect substitutes.
15As in the case of (13), we estimate (15) excluding the cells of workers with less than 10 years of experience.
22These estimates are somewhat smaller in absolute value than those reported in national studies
by Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the US and Manacorda et al. (2006) for the UK. Many reasons
may lie behind this result. First of all, as mentioned in Section 4, we identify foreign workers
as those having foreign nationality. This group includes also second (and later) generation im-
migrants, who are likely to be much more similar to the native Western German workforce than
¯rst generation immigrants on which the above-mentioned US and UK studies focus. Moreover,
the IAB data include only employees covered by social security. This may compress the vari-
ability among workers, increasing the estimated degree of substitutability. Finally, many of the
immigrants to West Germany were and are from Europe and share educational-cultural systems
that are more similar to those of natives than those of Mexican immigrants in the US. Hence,
when compared with the US, it is reasonable to expect less diversi¯cation in skills and therefore
less complementarity in the German labor market between immigrants and natives. The degree
of imperfect substitutability, however, is su±cient to produce a signi¯cant average positive wage
e®ect on natives from overall immigration.
6 Wage E®ects
Based on the theoretical framework of Section 3 and, in particular, on the implied expressions (10)
and (12), we are now able to evaluate the total impact of immigration on the wages of native and old
migrant workers. In so doing, we rely on the employment e®ects estimated in Section 5.1 and the
elasticities of substitution ¾ and ¸ estimated in Section 5.2. As for the elasticities of substitution
between workers with di®erent education (±) and experience (´), we adopt the standard estimates
that have proved to be robust across various studies. Speci¯cally, we impose a value of ± around
2 (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Hamermesh, 1993; Angrist, 1995; Ciccone and Peri, 2005) and a value
of ´ around 4 (Borjas, 2003; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006).
6.1 Wage E®ects on Long-Term Immigrants, 1992-2001
The e®ects of new immigration on the wages of old (long-term) immigrants are given by expression
(12). This allows us to compute the overall impact of post-1992 immigration on the wages of pre-
1992 immigrant workers taking into account both the degree of substitutability between di®erent
groups of workers (±, ´, ¾ and ¸) and the role of employment e®ects (°).
Table 10 reports the results obtained imposing ¾ = 16 and ° = 0:804. The terms on the right
hand side of (12) can be sorted into two groups. The ¯rst group includes the terms that determine
a direct change in the wages of old immigrants for given supplies of natives and old immigrants
23(`direct e®ect'). The second group includes the terms that determine an indirect change in the
wages of old immigrants through changes in the supplies of native and old immigrants (`indirect
e®ect'). While the terms belonging to the latter group bear the label `response', those belonging
to the former bear no label. In Table 10 the direct and indirect e®ects of new immmigration are
denoted by A and B respectively. The table shows the direct, indirect and total wage e®ects of new
immigration from East Germany (columns I-III), from the rest of the world (columns IV-VI) and
from both (columns VII-IX). Notice, intuitively, that the `indirect e®ect', driven by the reduced
employment of old immigrants, attenuates the negative wage impact of new immigrants. This is
because the reduction in old immigrants' employment is a partial o®set for the increased supply
of new immigrants.
Column IX shows that the overall e®ects of new immigration on the wages of old immigrants
are negative, implying an average loss for the pre-1992 immigrant workers of 1.6% of their real
wage. This is not a particularly large number but it is certainly not negligible. In particular, old
immigrant workers with a high level of education su®er the highest losses (4%), which is explained
by the fact that post-1992 immigration to West Germany is relatively high-skilled. The comparison
between columns VII and VIII reveal that the reduction in the employment levels of old immigrants
attenuates the negative impact of immigration on wages by half of a percentage point, on average.
Decomposing the overall wage e®ect with respect to the origin of immigrants, columns III and
VI show that immigration from East Germany accounts for almost one third of the average negative
wage e®ect and almost one half of the negative wage e®ect for highly educated workers. This is
due to the fact that East German immigrants are on average more educated than immigrants from
the rest of the world.
Hence, new immigrants penalize old immigrants both in terms of employment and in terms of
wages, especially in the case of highly educated workers due to a relatively large in°ow of this
group of immigrants after 1992.
6.2 Wage E®ects on Natives, 1987-2001
Turning to the e®ects of immigration on native wages, we use expression (10). Following our
¯ndings in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.2.2, we impose the absence of employment e®ects for natives
(½ = 1) as well as imperfect substitutability between native and immigrant workers.
Table 11 reports the corresponding results for two cases: imperfect (column I) and perfect
(column II) substitutability between natives and immigrants. In the former case, the elasticity of
substitution between the two groups of workers is set to our estimated value ¾ = 16. In the latter
24case, it is set to in¯nity. With imperfect substitutability, column I shows a small, positive average
impact (+0:33%) of immigration on native wages over the period 1987-2001. Across educational
levels, relatively low educated workers experience a small improvement in their wage levels, while
highly educated ones su®er a small loss. This is again due to the fact that, during the period of
observation, immigration to Germany was relatively skilled.
These small positive wage e®ects are consistent with the absence of negative employment e®ects
found in Section 5.1.2. Moreover, even when in column II we impose perfect substitutability
(¾ = 1) between natives and immigrants, the overall e®ect on wages becomes negative but still
very close to zero, with the same distributional pattern across educational groups as in the case of
¾ = 16.
Hence, new immigrants do not penalize native workers either in terms of employment or in
terms of wages. Indeed, native workers with medium and low education see their wages rise.
6.3 The Cost of Rigidity
There is a growing consensus that the reaction of a country's labor market to immigration depends
on its institutional features and, in particular, that more `°exible' labor markets are more e±cient
in absorbing the supply shocks arising from migrant in°ows. In this section we use the framework
developed so far to quantify the monetary costs of labor market `rigidity' by asking how much
Germany would gain from a more `°exible' labor market.
To give operational content to the concepts of `rigidity' and `°exibility', we note that, in the
case of the UK, which is traditionally considered a more `°exible' labor market than the German
labor market, Manacorda, et al, (2006) conclude that, absent any employment e®ect, the only
sizeable e®ect of increased immigration is on the wages of those immigrants who are already there.
Accordingly, we interpret `rigidity' as leading to employment e®ects and `°exibility' as the absence
of those e®ects. Then we ask whether or not the fall in immigrant wages, which would occur if
employment e®ects were removed from the German labor market, would be compensated for by
the corresponding savings in unemployment insurance payments.
In our thought experiment we focus on the year 2001 and allow the wages of pre-1992 immigrants
to adjust downward until any adverse employment e®ect disappears16. The results of the thought
experiment are reported in Table 12 where all the values are expressed in real terms at year
2000 prices. According to (10) and (12), for employment e®ects to disappear, on average pre-
16We implicitly assume that wages do not fall below their reservation level for any group, so that their decline
does not a®ect labor supply in a world with no labor market rigidities.
251992 immigrants' wages have to fall by 0.66% and natives' wages have to increase by 0.01%.17
Multiplying the above variations ¯rst by the average wage levels prevailing in 2000, then by the
correspoding employment levels and ¯nally by a uniform weight equal to 50 (since our sample is a
2% simple random sample of the overall population), we calculate an overall decrease in the wages
paid to old immigrant workers equal to approximately 261.7 million euros per year.
In the last row of Table 12 we also calculate the cost sustained by the German government
to ¯nance the payment of the unemployment insurance bene¯ts to the displaced immigrant work-
ers. According to our calculations, based on an estimate of ° = 0:804, approximately 21,700 old
immigrants have been displaced by the 2001 in°ow of new immigrants. We multiply this value
by the average yearly cost of unemployment bene¯ts, which, following Adema et al. (2003), we
set at 15,000 euros per displaced worker. This is just a lower bound estimate of the overall cost
borne by the government because the full cost should also include unemployment assistance (for
the long-term unemployed), housing bene¯ts, active labor market policies, etc. The result is overall
expenditures equal to 313.5 million euros per year. Though a lower bound, this amount is still
larger than the total wage losses old immigrant workers would su®er in the absence of employment
e®ects.
Hence, if the German labor market were as `°exible' as the UK one, there would be room for
a Pareto-improving compensation scheme. In this sense, a more `°exible' German labor market
would be more e±cient in dealing with the e®ects of immigration. Interestingly, however, the main
bene¯ciary of such °exibility would be those old immigrants who get displaced by new immigrants
as, under more °exibility, they would retain their jobs, although at a lower wage. The bene¯t to
citizens would be in the form of lower taxes if one thinks that unemployment insurance is funded
by a general tax.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the recently revived literature analyzing the impact of immigration
within a general equilibrium framework which is able to take fully into account the interactions
between production factors and the overall e®ects of immigration on the economy (Aydemir and
Borjas, 2006; Borjas, 2003; Manacorda et al., 2006; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Peri, 2007).
With respect to the existing literature, we believe we have made some progress in the empirical
methodology employed. First, the elasticity parameters necessary to disentangle the wage e®ects
of immigration are estimated on a yearly basis instead of on 5 or 10 year intervals, thus enabling
17This happens due to the increase in the employment level of the complementary migrant workforce.
26better identi¯cation. Second, the strati¯cation of workers depending on their `equivalent education'
(i.e., the skill level required for the job they actually perform rather than their formal educational
achievement) makes it possible to identify groups of workers who should actually compete for the
same jobs.
Third, for the ¯rst time, we employ a general equilibrium framework including a labor supply
response to estimate explicitly the impact of new immigrants on old ones. The fact that we ¯nd
perfect substitutability between old and new immigrants but imperfect substitutability between
immigrants and natives provides indirect support for the idea that native and immigrant workers
do not compete for the same occupations. This result is con¯rmed when we look at the employment
e®ects of immigration, which is a necessary step given the rigidity of the German labor market. In
this respect, we ¯nd that new immigration has a negative impact on the employment level of old
immigrants and no impact on that of natives.
Fourth, in calculating the wage e®ects of immigration we take the aforementioned employment
e®ects into account. In so doing, we distinguish between the `direct e®ect' of immigration, which
refers to the change in wages taking place for given supplies of natives and old immigrants, and
the `indirect e®ect', which refers to the change in wages due to changes in the labor supplies of
di®erent groups of workers. The estimated wage e®ects of new immigrants are on average positive
but modest for natives and negative for old immigrants.
Finally, we have demonstrated a very simple ¯rst step as to how our general equilibrium frame-
work can be used to quantify the e®ects of labor market reforms. In particular, through a simple
thought experiment, we have been able to show that a labor market reform that removes the
negative employment e®ects of immigration (and increases its wage impact) would generate a re-
duction of unemployment insurance payments large enough to more than compensate the wage
losses of old immigrants. In other words, such reform would generate enough resources to support
a Pareto-improving compensation scheme.
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Immigrant Workers in West Germany as a Percentage of the Total Workforce  
























Note: Author’s calculations on IAB data. We consider as immigrants all foreign-born workers 
plus East Germans who moved to the West. Foreign-born are defined as those individuals 
without German nationality. 
 










Percentage of workers in each 
of 6 education groups, 
according to reported 
education 
Percentage of workers in each 
of 6 education groups, 
according to the estimated 
probabilities 
Column I  II 
HSD, no vocational edu  18.1  17.4 
HSG, no vocational edu  2.0  2.1 
HSD, vocational edu  63.0  64.0 
HSG, vocational edu  4.2  4.6 
Higher, non university, edu  5.1  5.1 
University degree  7.7  6.8 
Total 100  100 
 
Note:  Column II, distribution of “equivalent education” levels, obtained as a weighted average 
using as weights the estimated probabilities of each worker having each of the educational levels. 
These probabilities are estimated via an ordered probit in which the dependent variable is the 






























1987 1992 2001 
Up to 4  14.2%  27.8%  23.9% 
5 to 9  10.6%  18.8%  20.8% 
10 to 14  9.3%  19.4%  21.9% 
15 to 19  11.7%  16.3%  19.3% 
20 to 24  17.3%  16.9%  17.2% 
25 to 29  15.7%  20.0%  14.2% 
30 to 34  13.3%  17.1%  14.5% 
35 to 40  10.0%  14.1%  17.0% 
Low 
Education 
Total  12.9% 19.5% 19.3% 
Up to 4  10.0%  20.0%  18.4% 
5 to 9  6.4%  12.0%  15.1% 
10 to 14  5.8%  12.4%  14.0% 
15 to 19  7.6%  10.1%  12.1% 
20 to 24  10.8%  10.7%  11.3% 
25 to 29  8.9%  12.6%  9.6% 
30 to 34  7.9%  10.0%  9.7% 
35 to 40  6.5%  8.7%  10.9% 
Intermediate 
Education 
Total 8.1%  12.5%  13.1% 
Up to 4  6.5%  11.6%  14.0% 
5 to 9  3.8%  6.0%  10.3% 
10 to 14  4.8%  6.3%  8.4% 
15 to 19  6.2%  7.6%  7.1% 
20 to 24  5.8%  7.2%  6.8% 
25 to 29  3.8%  7.0%  6.4% 
30 to 34  3.3%  4.7%  5.9% 
35 to 40  2.5%  3.3%  6.1% 
High 
Education 
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Table 5 




Column I      II  III  IV 
  Main 
Specification  Robustness  checks 
Sample Males  only    Males and 
females  Males only  Males and 
females 
Gamma  0.804***    0.847*** 0.980*** 1.001*** 
Std.  Error (0.087)   (0.108) (0.100) (0.110) 
Education-experience  interactions  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Education-time  interactions  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Equivalent Education  Yes    Yes  No  No 
R2  0.83    0.85 0.78 0.84 
Observations  174    174 174 174 
H0: gamma=1, p-value:  0.03     0.16  0.84  0.99 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Note: dependent variable is the percentage increase in employment of all immigrant workers in the 
education-experience group. Explanatory variable is the inflow of new immigrant workers as 
percentage of the initial employment in the education-experience cell.  The method of estimation is 
least squares with each observation weighted by the employment of the cell.  Heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. We estimate the equation excluding the 0-5 year 
experience cell for the whole 1993-2001 period and the 5-10 year cell for the 1997-2001 sub-
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Table 6 
Effects of New Immigrants on Total Employment 
 
 
Column I    II  III  IV 
  Main 
Specification  Robustness  checks 
Sample Males  only    Males and 
females  Males only  Males and 
females 
Rho  1.333***  1.068*** 1.410*** 1.311*** 
Std.  Error (0.445)    (0.519) (0.304) (0.411) 
Education-experience  interactions  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Education-time  interactions  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Equivalent Education  Yes    Yes  No  No 
R2  0.49    0.54 0.4372 0.48 
Observations  360    360 360 360 
H0:  rho=1,  p-value:  0.45    0.90 0.18 0.45 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Note: dependent variable is the percentage increase in overall employment in the education-
experience group. Explanatory variable is the change of immigrant workers as percentage of the 
initial employment in the education-experience cell. The method of estimation is least squares with 
each observation weighted by the employment of the cell.  Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
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Table 7 
Effects of New Immigrants on Natives’ Employment, Education Groups Only 
 
 
Column I    II  III  IV 
  Main 
Specification  Robustness  checks 
Sample Males  only    Males and 
females  Males only  Males and 
females 
Rho  1.098***  1.438*** 1.024*** 1.275*** 
Std. Error 0.371    0.477  0.318  0.4 
Education  dummies  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Education specific time trend  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Equivalent Education  Yes    Yes  No  No 
R2  0.513    0.552 0.511 0.556 
Observations  45    45 45 45 
H0:  rho=1,  p-value:  0.79    0.36 0.94 0.50 





Note: dependent variable is the percentage increase in overall employment in the education-
experience group. Explanatory variable is the change of foreign-born workers as percentage of the 
initial employment in the education cell. The method of estimation is least squares with each 
observation weighted by the employment of the cell. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are 
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Table 8 
Estimates of the Substitutability between New and Old Immigrants 
 
 
Column I      II  III  IV 
 
Main 
Specification  Robustness  checks 






1/lambda 0.021    0.000  -0.012  -0.036 
Std error  0.018    0.023  0.012  0.021 
Educational Dummies  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Experience Dummies  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Equivalent Education  Yes    Yes  No  No 
Observations 195    195  195  195 
R2 0.59      0.68  0.82  0.85 





Note: Dependent variable is the wage of old relative to new immigrants and the explanatory 
variable is the employment of old relative to new immigrants within each education-experience cell. 
Period 1992-2001.  The method of estimation is least squares with each observation weighted by 
the employment of the cell. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
We estimate the equation excluding the 0-5 year experience cell for the whole 1993-2001 period 



























Estimates of the Substitutability between Natives and Immigrants 
 
Column I      II  III  IV 
 
Main 
Specification  Robustness  checks 
Sample Males  only    Males and 
females  Males only  Males and 
females 
1/σ  0.061***  0.056*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 
Std  error  0.019    0.018 0.014 0.013 
Educational  Dummies  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Experience  Dummies  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Dummies  Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Equivalent education  Yes    Yes  No  No 
Observations  360    360 360 360 
R2  0.88      0.88 0.85 0.83 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
Note: Dependent variable is the wage of native workers relative to immigrants and the explanatory 
variable is the employment of natives relative to immigrants within each education-experience cell. 
Period 1987-2001.  The method of estimation is least squares with each observation weighted by 
the employment of the cell. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 






























Percentage Changes in Real Wages of Old Immigrants Due to Recent Immigration. Long-Run Simulations 1992-2001 
Column I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII VIII  IX 




























Effects with full capital 
adjustment                         
Low  education  -0.42%  0.10%  -0.32%  -1.78%  0.41%  -1.37%  -2.20% 0.51%  -1.69%
Intermediate education  -0.67%  0.15%  -0.52%  -1.14%  0.25%  -0.90%  -1.82% 0.40%  -1.41%
High education  -2.20%  0.49%  -1.71%  -3.00%  0.65%  -2.35%  -5.20% 1.14%  -4.06%




Note: The entries in the table represent the real wage effects of immigration on old immigrants obtained using the formula (12) in the main text 
applied to each education-experience group and then aggregating within education group. The parameter values used for the simulations are as 
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Table 11 







Column I  II 
σ  16  ∞ 
Low education  1.04%  0.80% 
Intermediate education  0.36%  0.03% 
High education  -1.49%  -2.08% 







Note:  The entries in the table represent the simulated real wage effects of immigration on native workers obtained using the formula (10) in the 
main text applied to each education-experience group and then aggregating within education group. The parameter values used for the simulations 
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Table 12 
 Policy Experiment 





    A B C D E  F=A*B*C*D G=F*365 
  


















West German native 
workers 192657  50  90  -0.01%  -0.0095  -91234  -33300364
Migrants 29944  50  74  0.66%  0.4888  731826  267116465
           
   Units  Sampling 
Weight 
Average 
UI cost           Total cost 
Displaced pre-1992 
migrants  434  50  14449           313543300
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